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Discovery of Non-Testifying "In-House" Experts
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 261
JAMES

R. PIELEMEIER*

Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure limits discovery of
facts known or opinions held by "experts" where those facts and opinions
were "acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial." The
rule purports to set forth the nature of these limitations with respect to
experts who will testify at trial and "retained or specially employed experts" who will not testify.' However, a person seeking to discern the limitations on discovery of a third category of experts, non-testifying experts
who are regularlyemployed by a party and acquire and develop facts and
opinions in anticipation of litigation, faces a significant amount of fog. The
issue of what, if any, limitations apply to discovery of these "in-house" experts is not addressed plainly by the rule, and the advisory committee note
only enhances the uncertainty.2 Commentators have only briefly skimmed
the issue and have reached divergent conclusions with minimal analyses.'
The courts understandably have reached differing conclusions as well.4
The preferred resolution of the issue of what prerequisites apply to
discovery of in-house experts would be an amendment to the rule among
the spate of others recently proposed.5 However, this is not in the offing
t Copyright 1984 by James R. Pielemeier. All rights reserved.
* Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law. The author would like to thank
Peter N. Thompson, Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law, Visiting Professor
of Law, William Mitchell College of Law, for his helpful comments on this article.
FED. R.Civ. P. 26(b)(4).
2 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note (1970).
Professors Wright and Miller devote four sentences to the issue, stating that such experts should be treated as ordinary witnesses. C. WRIGHT &A. MILLER. 8 FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE §2029, at 250 and S1033, at 258 (1971). The same conclusion is reached in a three
page discussion in Johnston, Discovery in Illinois and Federal Courts, 15 J. MAR. L. REV. 1,

33-36 (1983) and in a discussion of slightly over one page in Logan, Post-1970Amendment
Developments, 46 J. KAN. B.A. 9, 10-12 (1977). A student comment devoted one paragraph to
the subject, concluding that no discovery whatsoever is permitted by the rule. Comment,
Ambiguities After the 1970 Amendments to the FederalRules of Civil ProcedureRelating to
Discovery of Experts and Attorneys Work Product, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 1145, 1167 (1971). Professor Graham, in his lengthy treatment of rule 26(b)(4), devotes two paragraphs to the issue
and concludes that "in-house" experts should be treated the same as "retained" experts.
Graham, Discovery ofExperts UnderRule 26(b)(4) of the FederalRules of Civil Procedure:Part
One, An Analytical Study, ILL. L.F. 895,941-43 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Graham, PartOne].
Professor Moore does not even address the subject in his treatise. See 4 J. MOORE, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.66[2] (2d ed. 1982).
See infra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
See PreliminaryDraft of ProposedAmendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure,
90 F.R.D. 451 (1981). The proposals recently have been adopted in modified form. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,97 F.R.D. 165 (1983).
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and the floundering for an appropriate resolution is likely to continue. In
such a confused atmosphere, some bearings are needed.
This article will focus on the appropriate bearings, which can be extracted
from the policies underlying discovery and its limitations. After noting the
context in which the issue arises and illustrating how rule 26(b)(4) fails to
delineate clearly the appropriate limitations on discovery of in-house experts, the article will extract the policies pertinent to its resolution that
emanate from the Rules. The article then will explore comprehensively how
these policies apply to the in-house expert context and suggest the resolution of the issue that is most consistent with them. It is hoped that the
article will serve to avoid the struggle presently facing courts that are
forced to muddle through this unnecessarily inexplicit area.
I.

THE "IN-HOUSE" EXPERT

Any discussion of the discoverability of in-house experts must begin with
an understanding of the factual context in which the issue arises. Neither
rule 26(b)(4) nor the advisory committee note provide guidelines for determining whether a person of whom discovery is sought is an "expert" and
therefore arguably protected by the rule. In addition, reported litigation
on this issue has been minimal.
The "expert" status of the person of whom discovery is sought is assumed in most reported decisions dealing with the discoverability of in-house
experts. The courts rarely discuss the skills or qualifications of the
employee. In the few decisions in which the skills of the employee are mentioned, the employee could be described as a "professional." The employees
in these cases have included engineers who studied remnants of an airplane
crash6 and a partner in an auditing firm who studied audits that were the
subject of securities litigation." In-house expert discovery was also addressed in a patent infringement suit, where discovery was sought of tests made
by analytical chemists to determine the ingredients of the allegedly infringing product.'
Settled law dealing with experts in other contexts, however, establishes
that "expert" status is not restricted to professionals. The black letter rule
on whether a person has sufficient expert qualifications to testify as to his
opinion at trial is that the individual "must have sufficient skill, knowledge,
or experience in that field or calling as to make it appear that his opinion
or inference will probably aid the trier in his search for truth."9 Under the
6 Breedlove v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 57 F.R.D. 202 (N.D. Miss. 1972).

Seiffer v. Topsy's Int. Inc., 69 F.R.D. 69 (D. Kan. 1975). Cf. Inspiration Consol. Copper
Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Gas. Co., 60 F.R.D. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (regularly employed auditing
firm requested to analyze damages).
' Loctite Corp. v. Fel-Pro, Inc., 30 FED. R. SERv.2d (Callaghan) 1587 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
9 MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 30 (E.Cleary 2d ed. 1972). See also J.
WALTZ, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE

301 (1975) (opinion of an expert should depend on special knowledge,

skill, or training not within the ordinary experience of lay jurors).
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Federal Rules of Evidence, his knowledge must be "specialized."'"
Because no distinct definition of an "expert" under rule 26(b)(4) was provided by its drafters, it is reasonable to assume that it contemplates use
of these flexible trial standards in determining expert status. Use of these
standards is appropriate because discovery is part of the litigation process
leading up to a trial. Rule 26(b)(4) is designed in part to protect persons
who in fact will be expert witnesses at trial." Absent a compelling reason
to do otherwise, application of uniform standards throughout the process
is desirable.
Because the issues in a case frequently will not be fully developed at the
discovery stage, however, a determination at that time of whether a person does have specialized knowledge that will aid the trier in his search
for truth often will be virtually impossible. Thus, a reasonable possibility
that this standard would be met if the person subject to discovery were
to testify at trial seems to be an appropriate modified test for use in
discovery. It retains the substance of the standards apparently contemplated by the drafters of the Rules, modifying them only as is necessary
to accommodate the realities of discovery. Apparently applying such a
modified standard, one court has characterized an argument that persons
were not qualified as experts for discovery purposes as "specious."' 2 Opining that hearings on their qualifications would be wasteful, the court noted
that their testimony would be opinion evidence resulting in their being
classified as expert witnesses if they testified at all. 3 They therefore would
be treated as experts for purposes of discovery, subject to objection to their
qualifications at trial' There appear to be no opinions to the contrary.
Under this test, any person with specialized knowledge who, if called
at trial, would give opinion testimony is an "expert" for purposes of
discovery. Rule 26(b)(4), however, does not limit discovery of all information sought from persons falling within this definition. To qualify for protection under the rule, the information sought from the expert must have
been "acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation."'" Thus, the issue
" FED. R. EviD. 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
" See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b(4)(A).
"2Herbst v. Int'l. Tel. & Tel. Corp., 65 F.R.D. 528, 529 n.1 (D. Conn. 1975).
13 Id.
14Id.

11FED. R. Civ.P. 26(b)(4). The "test" for determining whether the information was acquired
in this manner has been stated to be "whether, in light of the nature of the documents [sought]
and factual situation in a particular case, the experts and their information can fairly be said
to have been obtained or acquired because of the prospect of litigation." In re Sinking of Barge
"Ranger I", 32 FED. R. SERV. 2d (Callaghan) 1708,1711 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
According to Professor Moore, facts known to a party through his expert are discoverable.
See 4 J. MOORE,supra note 3, 26.66[2], at 26-481. He states that the rule precludes obtaining
the information from the expert himself, and precludes identification of the facts and opinions as the work of the expert. Id. He concludes that the facts and opinions protected are
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of whether the rule limits experts' amenability to discovery normally will
arise when they have been asked to study and report on the matters giving rise to litigation after the events that triggered it have occurred.16 The
advisory committee note makes it clear that actors or viewers "with respect
to transactions or occurrences that are part of the subject matter of the
law suit" are not protected. 7 Facts known and opinions held by experts
before the prospect of litigation arose, such as the process by which a product was produced and an expert's opinion1 8 at the time of production of the
safety of the process, are not protected.
Although the "anticipation of litigation" requirement of the rule substantially narrows the field of experts arguably protected from discovery, the
resulting definition is still quite broad. The foregoing suggests that virtually anyone with some "uncommon" skill, knowledge, or experience
relating to an issue in a case would qualify as an "expert" under rule 26(b)(4)
so long as his facts were acquired and opinions developed in anticipation
of litigation, not as an actor or viewer to the underlying occurrence. In the
in-house expert context, protected persons could range from employees
learned in nuclear physics to apprentice mechanics in a defendant's
automobile repair shop.
"test results and the like" and the conclusions predicated upon them, rather than the factual
contentions of the party, whether sustainable by expert testimony or not. Id. at n.2.
Because experts frequently will be engaged with their employer in a protected "mulling
over" process, see infra text accompanying notes 86-89, Professor Moore's exception to limited
discovery should be applied narrowly to avoid "back-door" evasion of rule 26(b)(4)'s limitations. In addition, in the in-house expert context, it might be argued that a regular employee
is the party and, applying Professor Moore's exception, should be required to divulge all facts
he has learned. Acceptance of this argument, however, would be inconsistent with the policies
this article notes are reflected by rule 26(b)(4). Rather, in this context, this article's conclusion that in-house experts should be treated as retained experts can be effectuated only if
Professor Moore's term, "party," is defined as limited to those persons to whom retained
experts would normally relate facts they have learned.
I' For example, see Seiffer v. Topsy's Int'l Inc., 69 F.R.D. 69 (D. Kan. 1975) where the court
protected an in-house expert from discovery, specifically noting that he had no involvement
in the activities giving rise to the suit and contrasting the availability of discovery against
persons who had been involved in those activities. Id. at 72-73 n.3.
17See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(bX4) advisory committee note. The court in Marine Petroleum Co.
v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 641 F.2d 984, 992 n.47 (D.C. Cir. 1980) noted that information
concerning an employer's activities gained in the course of litigation assistance is protected
by the rule, and that to say that an expert by acquiring such information has become an actor or viewer "is to emasculate the rule."
" Cf. Rodriguez v. Hrinda, 56 F.R.D. 11, 12 (W.D. Pa. 1972), where the court rejected a
contention that a defendant physician could not be deposed on opinions he held regarding
the post-operative condition of his patient because it viewed rule 26(b)(4) as applicable only
to experts engaged in anticipation of litigation or for trial.
Protection of any particular expert under the rule is not necessarily an all or nothing proposition. In Marine Petroleum Co., v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 641 F.2d 984, 992 (D.C. Cir.
1980), the court noted that "one may simultaneously be a litigational expert with rule 26(b)(4)
protection as to some matters and simply an unprotected actor or witness as to others." In
Hermsdorfer v. American Motors Corp., 96 F.R.D. 13 (W.D.N.Y. 1982), however, the court
held that an expert employed for dual purposes, preparing for litigation and product improvement, was entitled to all the protection provided for experts employed for litigation
preparation.

IN-HOUSE EXPERTS
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Adverse reaction to the breadth of this definition on the ground that it
may shield too many persons from discovery, however, should be tempered.
Some persons falling within the definition may have only marginal expert
qualifications, and there will be little legitimate reason to seek discovery
of them when they have no firsthand knowledge of the underlying facts.
In fact, protection of such persons from discovery may reduce harassing
discovery, and "fact" witnesses will still be subject to normal discovery.
As a practical matter, the persons the definition will protect from discovery
in any particular case will be a small number of relatively well qualified
experts. It is in this context that the battles under rule 26(b)(4) will be
fought.
Regardless of the magnitude of an "expert" employee's qualifications,
an employer may find it convenient to ask his opinion about a case in which
the employer is a party. The context may be a short conversation in which
the employer briefly relates his opponent's contentions and wants confirmation of his belief that they are incredible, or it may be a request that
the employee devote months to intensive study of a technical issue in a
case alongside a battery of outside experts. In either event, the opposing
party may wish to undertake discovery to ascertain what the employee
has learned or concluded in the process. When this wish is manifested by
a formal discovery request, the fog of rule 26(b)(4) comes to the fore.
II.

THE FAILURE OF THE RULE

Rule 26(b)(4) purports to be the exclusive means by which discovery can
be obtained of "facts known and opinions held by experts ....acquired or
developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial ...." Subdivision (A)
19

Rule 26(b)(4) reads in its entirety as follows:
(4) TrialPreparation:Experts. Discovery of facts known and opinions held
by experts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of subdivision (b)(1) of
this rule and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may
be obtained only as follows:
(A) i) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at
trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and
a summary of the grounds for each opinion. (ii) Upon motion, the court may order
further discovery by other means, subject to such restrictions as to scope and
such provisions, pursuant to subdivision (b)(4) (C)of this rule, concerning fees
and expenses as the court may deem appropriate.
(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has
been retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness
at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to
obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, (i)the court shall require that the
party seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery under subdivisions (b) (4) (A) (iii) and (b) (4) (B)of this rule; and

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:597

permits limited inquiry by interrogatories regarding persons a party expects to call as expert witnesses at trial and provides for further discovery
of them upon motion."0 Subdivision (B) permits discovery of experts who
have been "retained or specially employed ... in anticipation of litigation
or preparation for trial" and who are not expected to be called as witnesses
at trial, "upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is
impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions
on the same subject by other means." Subdivision (C) requires the party
seeking discovery to pay reasonable fees of experts for their time spent
in responding to discovery beyond the limited interrogatories regarding
experts who will be witnesses. In addition, with respect to experts who
will testify it permits, and with respect to "retained or specially employed"
experts it requires, a court to order the party seeking discovery beyond
the limited interrogatories to pay the other party a fair portion of the expenses incurred by the latter in obtaining facts and opinions from the
expert.
Non-testifying regularly employed "in-house" experts are not clearly
within the explicit language of the rule's subdivisions. Subdivision (A) is
inapplicable because they will not testify. Subdivision (B) is not clearly applicable because the category of experts "retained or specially employed
...in anticipation of litigation" may be read as not encompassing regular
employees. Yet, regular employees clearly can be experts who have learned
and developed facts and opinions in anticipation of litigation, and thus they
fall within the general scope of the rule. Thus, while they appear to be within
the category of persons to which the protection of the rule was addressed,
the issue of what specific standards govern their amenability to discovery
is not resolved by the rule. The resulting uncertainty has led to three different interpretations of the rule's application to in-house experts.
One interpretation is that non-testifying in-house experts are totally immune from discovery. This reading of the rule focuses on its introductory
language that discovery of experts who acquired or developed information
in anticipation of litigation "may be obtained only as follows."'" Because
non-testifying in-house experts may be encompassed within this introductory language and none of the following subdivisions clearly permits any

(ii) with respect to discovery obtained under subdivision (b) (4)
(A) (ii) of this rule
the court may require, and with respect to discovery obtained under subdivision (b) (4) (B) of this rule the court shall require, the party seeking discovery
to pay the other party a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred
by the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4).
I There is no consensus on what standard should be used to order additional discovery
of an expert under rule 26(b}(4)(A)(ii). Some courts allow virtually unlimited discovery, while
others are quite restrictive. See Connors, A New Look at an Old Concern-ProtectingExpert
InformationFrom Discovery Under the Federal Rules, 18 DuQ. L. REv. 271, 273-77 (1980).
21 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) (emphasis added).
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discovery of these experts, the logical implication of the rule is that no
discovery of in-house experts is permitted.
This interpretation can also be supported by the advisory committee note.
The note states that because subdivision (b)(4)(B) does not encompass experts "informally consulted" in preparation for trial, the rule precludes
discovery of these experts.' If in-house experts similarly are not encompassed by the subdivision, a consistent interpretation of the rule requires
preclusion of discovery as to them as well. Accordingly, at least one
commentator' has espoused this view, and the logic of a United States court
of appeals decision dealing with informally consulted experts, if applied
to in-house experts, would also compel this result.4
A second interpretation of the rule is that it imposes no special restrictions whatsoever on discovery of in-house experts. This interpretation has
been made through three different approaches. One federal magistrate, confronted with an argument that discovery of an expert was limited by rule
26(b)(4), rejected the argument by noting that the expert was a regular
employee of a party and blithely stating that this fact "makes all the difference in the world."' The magistrate did not say why this fact made such
a difference, but merely quoted a portion of the advisory committee note
stating that "a general employee of the party not specially employed on
the case" is excluded from the category of experts covered by subdivision
(B).26 The magistrate apparently concluded from this language that all
regular employees are outside the scope of subdivision (B) and are therefore
outside of the rule's protection.' Of course, the latter conclusion ignores
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note.
See, Comment, Ambiguities After the 1970 Amendments, supra note 3, at 1167, contrasting
"permanently" employed experts with "specially" employed experts and concluding that the
former are not within subdivision (b)(4)(B). Professors Wright and Miller characterize this
view as "simply incorrect" in that it fails to take account of the introductory language of
the rule. C. WRIGHT &. A. MILLER, supranote 3, S2033, at n.91 (Supp. 1982). They do not specify
what portion of the introductory language the commentator failed to consider. The criticism
as phrased is surprising in light of the fact that the commentator's position is premised on
the introductory language that limits discovery of experts to the circumstances specified
in the subdivisions of the rule. The criticism makes sense only if one assumes that an inhouse expert cannot be one within the introductory language limiting its coverage to experts who acquire or develop information in anticipation of litigation or for trial. Such an
assumption is unwarranted.
I4See USM Corp. v. American Aerosols, Inc., 631 F.2d 420, 424-25 (6th Cir. 1980) ("Since
discovery of expert information acquired in anticipation of litigation can only be had in accordance with Rule 26(b)(4), if no provision is made'for experts informally consulted in anticipation of litigation, no discovery concerning them is permissible.").
I Clark v. General Motors, 20 FED. R. SERv. 2d (Callaghan) 679, 687 (D. Mass. 1975).
Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note).
The magistrate apparently was uncertain whether the employee would testify at trial.
Assuming that he would testify, the magistrate held that because the expert was a regular
employee, the discretion to permit further discovery under rule 26(b)(4)(A) should be exercised in favor of permitting depositions. Id. at 687. Assuming the employee would not testify,
the magistrate said the result should be the same, citing the advisory committee note. Id.
at 687. The magistrate's conclusion that the advisory committee note's "exclusion" of regular
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the introductory language of the rule limiting discovery of litigation experts to the mechanisms provided by the rule.
A second approach leading to the conclusion that no protection is provided to in-house experts was taken by the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia in VirginiaElectric & Power Co. v. Sun
Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co.2" The court undertook a detailed review of
the language of the rule and advisory committee note to ascertain whether
the rule limited discovery of in-house experts. Finding no specific guidance
in any language, it concluded that no rule 26(b)(4) limitations applied, largely
on the premise that an "expert" is by nature impartial. Since a general
employee cannot be impartial, the court concluded, he cannot be an "expert" protected by the rule.' This rationale is questionable, as few litigators
would concur that all persons considered experts in judicial proceedings,
particularly those who will testify, are nonpartisan,' and no other published
decision suggests that the rule's protection applies only to nonpartisan
experts.
Professors Wright and Miller also conclude that no limitations on in-house
expert discovery are provided by the rule, apparently by taking a third
approach to the effect that regularly employed experts are not experts who
have acquired information in preparation for trial and therefore are not
covered by the introductory language of the rule." Because regularly

employees from subdivision (B) totally dispensed with the rule's protections is apparent from
the fact that he made no finding of "extraordinary circumstances" under subdivision (B). To
permit free discovery of a non-testifying expert without such a finding is equivalent to holding
that the rule's limitations on non-testifying experts simply are inapplicable. The magistrate's
alternative holdings result in the anomaly that, under the language of the rule, regular
employees who will testify are entitled to greater protection than non-testifying regular
employees. With respect to testifying employees, an order permitting discovery beyond the
limited interrogatories would be required, while the court's rationale would provide no protection to non-testifying employees. This anomaly reverses the policy embodied in the rule's
structure that testifying experts should be more amenable to discovery than non-testifying
ones.
See also Kelleher v. Omark Industries, Inc., 20 FED. R. SEav. 2d (Callaghan) 1430,1433 (D.
Mass. 1975) where the same magistrate stated that reliance on rule 26(b)(4)(B) to protect regular
employees from discovery was inappropriate because of the advisory committee note's exclusion of them from the purview of that subdivision.
68 F.R.D. 397 (E.D. Va. 1975).
Id. at 406-08.
See MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE. supra note 9, at 38-41 (discussing
remedies to redress the partisan element in the selection of experts). When this author described the rationale of the Virginia Electric Power decision to a partner of a 200 lawyer
law firm who had worked in products liability litigation, the partner's laughter was sustained. He suggested that in such litigation, the question attorneys implicitly ask in evaluating
the potential expert testimony of each party is, to paraphrase, whether "my whore" will be
more persuasive than "your whore."
"' C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER. supranote 3, § 2029, at 250 (regularly employed experts are within
the class of experts whose information was not acquired in preparation for trial) and S2033,
at 258 (blanket statement that regularly employed experts are not protected). Professor
Graham has stated that Professors Wright and Miller apparently assume that all regular
employees may be classified as occurrence witnesses who are not protected by the rule.
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employed experts clearly can acquire information in anticipation of litigation, this unexplained general assumption is unwarranted.2
A third interpretation of the rule's application to in-house experts is that
in-house experts can be deemed "specially employed" and that discovery
of them is specifically, governed by the provisions of subdivision (B). For
example, Professor Graham has suggested that a regular employee may
become "specially employed" when he is designated and assigned by a party
to apply his expertise to a particular matter in anticipation of litigation
or for trial.3 This conclusion can also be drawn from language in the ad-

visory committee note excluding from the scope of rule 26(b)(4)(B) "a general
employee of a party not specially employed on the case"' which suggests
by negative implication that a "general employee" may or may not be
"specially employed" and within subdivision (B).
However, this interpretation, like the others, has not been uniformly accepted. The rule protects experts who have been specially "employed," not
specially "assigned" to work on litigation, and at least one court35 and one
commentator 36 believe that current employees cannot suddenly become
"specially employed." The conclusion that regular employees are not within
subdivision (B) also can be supported by reading the language of the advisory committee note 37 as merely descriptive of the nature of a "general
employee" to the effect that he cannot be deemed "specially employed."
Graham, PartOne, supra note 3, at 941-42. However, to the extent regular employees, in
anticipation of litigation, develop information subsequent to the occurrence giving rise to
litigation, they are no more "occurrence witnesses" than are retained experts who acquire
information in the same manner.
I For other authorities suggesting that the rule provides no special limitations upon
discovery of in-house experts, see Loctite Corp. v. Fel-Pro, Inc., 30 FED.R. SERV. 2d (Callaghan)
1587, 1597 (N.D. 11. 1980) and Johnson, supra note 3, at 33-34.
1 Graham, PartOne, supra note 3, at 942. See also Seiffer v. Topsy's Int'l Inc., 69 F.R.D.
69 (D. Kan. 1975) (concluding that a regular employee may be "specially employed" within
the language of the rule).
According to the Comment, Ambiguities in the 1970 Amendments, supra note 3, at 1167,
an advisory committee member stated that the omission of regularly employed experts from
the rule "is a complete oversight of the draftsmen since they did intend to make the 'house'
expert discoverable if the circumstances under 26(b)(4) warrant it."
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note.
In Virginia Elec. Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397,407 (E.D.
Va. 1975), the court concluded that the distinction between "retained" and "specially employed"
experts, both being within the scope of subdivision (B), is the difference between an expert
hired as an independent contractor and an expert hired as an employee pro hac vice. Under
that interpretation of those terms, the categories would not encompass persons who are
already employees. The court indicated its belief that the drafters easily could have used
the word "assigned" instead of "employed" if that had been their intent. Id. at 408.
m Logan states that the words "specially employed" refer to the manner by which the
expert was employed, and that an "already employed expert" can hardly be said to be "specially
employed." Logan, supranote 3, at 11. He agreed with the VirginiaElectricPower decision
that in-house experts are outside the protection of the rule, but would come to a different
conclusion if the language of the rule protected experts who were "specially assigned." Logan,
supra note 3, at 12.
1 See supra text accompanying note 34.
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In addition, if one concludes that "special employment" commences when
an employee begins work in anticipation of litigation, the "specially
employed" language of subdivision (B) becomes redundant of the introductory language of the rule protecting information acquired in anticipation
of litigation."8 This suggests that the "specially employed" language refers
to the circumstances of the employee's hiring, not the nature of the work
to which the employee is assigned, and lends some credence to the view
that general employees are not within the subdivision.
By current count, then, the discoverability of in-house experts under the
Rules has been interpreted at least three different ways: no discovery, full
discovery, and discovery as it is limited to retained and specially employed
experts. Because the language of the rule and advisory committee note apparently fail to provide clear guidance on this issue, the competing policies
underlying discovery and rule 26(b)(4) must be examined to determine the
most appropriate resolution.
III.

RELEVANT POLICIES

At least four policies merit recognition in ascertaining the standards
under which in-house experts will be subject to discovery. The first is the
policy of liberal discovery. The second is the policy of avoiding financial
"unfairness." The third is the "free ride" policy, which has three "subpolicies" of discouraging laziness, encouraging diligence, and protecting confidentiality in trial preparation. The fourth is a policy of deference to an
expert's feelings of loyalty.
The policy of liberal discovery underlies all the discovery rules. 9 The
purposes of discovery include narrowing and clarifying the issues between
the parties and ascertainment of "facts, or information as to the existence
or whereabouts of facts, relative to those issues."4 Broad knowledge of facts
and information relating to issues in a case enables each party to present
its case to the fullest and in its most favorable light.4'1 Liberal discovery,
resulting in broad knowledge of the facts and effective case presentations,
is thought to lead through the adversary process to a greater likelihood
that adjudications will be based on the true facts."
I A parsed version of the rule incorporating Professor Graham's position would be to
the effect that expert "information developed in anticipation of litigation may be discovered
only upon a showing of extraordinary circumstances where an expert employee's information was developed in anticipation of litigation:' Under this interpretation, the words "specially
employed" add nothing to the rule.
'" Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 505 (1947) (liberal atmosphere surrounds discovery
rules); id. at 507 (deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment).
40Id.

at 501.
See id. at 507 ("Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is
essential to proper litigation."); D. LOUISELL, G.HAZARD &C.TAIT, PLEADING AND PROCEDURE.
41

STATE AND FEDERAL, CASES AND MATERIALS

818 (5th ed. 1983).

See Tiedman v. American Pigment Corp., 253 F.2d 803, 808 (4th Cir. 1958) (discovery
is founded on the policy that the search for truth should be aided, resulting in liberal con2
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This policy of liberal discovery is conditioned, however, by other policies.
These other policies are reflected by rules that place limits on the breadth
of permissible discovery. The limiting rule most pertinent to discovery of
in-house experts is the one limiting discovery of experts, rule 26(b)(4).
The advisory committee note to rule 26(b)(4) states that the rule adopts
a form of the "doctrine of 'unfairness,.' 4 which suggests that protection
against "unfairness" is a policy underlying the rule that limits broad
discovery. While "unfairness" has little concrete meaning in the abstract,
the authorities cited by the advisory committee in support of this statement give it some substance.44 Each focuses onfinancialunfairness. Their
thrust is that it is "unfair" to require a party who has expended resources

in the employment of an expert to turn over the fruits of these expenditures
gratis to an opponent. 5
struction of rules); D. LOUISELL, G. HAZARD, & C. TAIT. supra note 41, at 818; 4 J. MOORE,
supra note 3, 26.02[2], at 26-65.
4S FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note.
" See infra note 45.
,5The first authority cited by the advisory committee note, United States v. 27.76 Acres
of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593 (D. Md. 1963), described the rationale of cases denying discovery on
the basis of "unfairness" as being: "Discovery would result in unfairness to the party from
whom discovery is sought, in that it is unfair for that person to pay the cost of obtaining
expert knowledge and opinions and require him to disclose them to his opponent." Id. at 596.
Yet, in purporting to apply the doctrine, the court was of the view that this type of unfairness
could be mitigated by requiring the discovering party to pay for the expert's time. The court
stated that payment for the time the expert spent at the deposition could avoid the unfairness
otherwise arising from the fact that the employing party would have to pay such costs, and
unfairness is said to result because one party desires to adopt as his own the experthat "[ilf
tise paid for by the other party, that abuse of discovery, too, can be countered .... Id. at
597. The court followed this last statement with a citation to United States v. 50.34 Acres
of Land, 13 F.R.D. 19 (E.D.N.Y. 1952), where the court permitted discovery of experts retained by the government who would not testify at trial and who the discovering party believed
held opinions unfavorable to the government, upon payment of a portion of the expenses
paid by the government in retaining their services. Thus, the court in the 27.76 Acres case
was of the view that "financial unfairness" could be remedied simply by a shifting of expenses.
The second citation following reference to the "doctrine of unfairness" in the advisory
committee note is to Professor Louisell's MODERN CALIFORNIA DIscOvERY (1963). Professor
Louisell quoted the following passage from Lewis v. United Airlines Transport Corp., 32 F.
Supp. 21 (W.D. Pa. 1940) as being reflective of the concept of unfairness: "To permit a.party
by deposition to examine an expert of the opposite party before trial, to whom the latter
has obligated himself to pay a considerable sum of money, would be equivalent to taking
another's property without making any compensation therefore." D. LOUISELL. MODERN
CALIFORNIA DISCOVERY 317-18 (1963).
The advisory committee note's third citation was to 4 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.26 (2d ed. 1966). The updated version of the cited paragraph, 4 J. MOORE, supra note
3, at 26.66[2], adds little to the "financial unfairness" aspect of the "doctrine of unfairness."
It refers to earlier editions of the treatise where the author took the position that discovery
of experts should not ordinarily be permitted absent a showing that the facts or information

sought were necessary to the moving party's preparation for trial and could not be obtained
by the moving party's independent investigation or research. Yet, without explaining the
reason for such limitation, the treatise's position was that the court should have discretion
to order discovery upon the condition that the moving party pay a reasonable portion of the
fees of the expert. Id. 26.66[1], at 26-471 to -472. There is one additional aspect of "unfairness"
hinted at by the treatise's description of cases pre-dating the present rule that, according
to the authors, represent the doctrine. It is a notion that the expert possesses a "loyalty"
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This financial "unfairness" policy alone does not explain the overall structure of rule 26(b)(4). Subdivision (b)(4)(C) provides for, and in most cases
requires, payment by the discovering party for the expert's time in
discovery and portions of expenses incurred by the employing party in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert. The policy of avoiding financial
unfairness would be fulfilled by that provision alone. Yet, the rule limits
discovery notwithstanding payment, which leads to the conclusion that additional limiting policies underlie the rule.46
One additional policy that is reflected in the rule can be characterized
as the "free ride" policy. This policy was articulated in Justice Jackson's
concurring opinion in the seminal attorney work product case, Hickman
v. Taylor, to the effect that "Discovery was hardly intended to enable a
learned profession to perform its functions either without wits or on wits
'
borrowed from the adversary."47
The policy recently was reaffirmedin the
majority opinion of the Supreme Court in Upjohn Co. v. United States."
The free ride policy incorporates three "sub-policies" or component principles. One is similar to the financial unfairness policy, that one party should
not be able simply to help itself to the fruits of the other party's diligence
in trial preparation because such a practice would promote laziness in trial
preparation by the party seeking discovery." This may be called the
"discouraging laziness" policy. The second sub-policy is the flip side of the
first, that protection of the fruits of diligent trial preparation from discovery
will encourage diligence in trial preparation because the attorney will know
that his efforts cannot be confiscated by his opponent. 0 This may be called
interest in assisting only his initial employer that should not be lightly intruded upon. The
treatise, 4 J. MOORE, supra note3, 26.66[1] at 26-464, quotes Boynton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco
Co., 36 F. Supp. 593, 595 (D. Mass. 1941):
An expert employed by one of the parties ought not to be compelled to furnish
expert testimony to the other just because the latter offers him compensation.
It is his privilege, if not his duty, to refuse compensation from one of the parties when he has already accepted employment for the other, and such refusal
ought not of itself to result in his being ordered to testify.
However, aside from this, no other indication of what is meant by "unfairness" is given by
the treatise, other than quotations from cases suggesting that discovery of the adversary's
expert is somehow unseemly. For a description of the cases, see 4 J. MOORE, supranote 3,
26.66[1], at 26-465 n.5.
See also Long, Discovery and Experts Underthe FederalRules of CivilProcedure,38 F.R.D.
111, 131 (1966) (reprinted from 39 WASH. L. REv. 665 (1964)) ("The considerations of fairness
proceed principally from the expense of experts.").
46 Professor Friedenthal notes that financial unfairness does not, standing alone, justify
limitations on discovery of experts, as it is a policy that could equally be applicable to discovery
of any witness who was unearthed at considerable expense to a party. Friedenthal, Discovery
and Use of an Adverse Party'sExpert Information, 14 STAN. L. REv. 455, 487 (1962).
, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947).
48 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981).
, Cf. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 518 (1947) (party seeking witnesses' statements
gave no reason why he could not interview them himself) (Jackson, J., concurring); supra
text accompanying note 47.
' See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511 ("Were [trial preparation] materials open to opposing counsel
on mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing would remain unwritten:').

1983]

IN-HOUSE EXPERTS

the "encouraging diligence" policy. The third sub-policy is a necessary incident of the effectuation of the first two, that although discovery of all
relevant facts underlying the litigation is to be encouraged to enable the
parties to present relevant evidence and to question effectively the evidence
of their opponents, privacy and confidentiality in the development of trial
strategy and theories of the case should be maintained.' This may be called
the "protecting confidentiality" policy. 2
The advisory committee note states that the provisions of rule 26(b)(4)
"reject as ill-considered the decisions which have sought to bring expert
information within the work product doctrine."' Because the free ride subpolicies are reflected in cases dealing with protection of work product,'
this statement in the advisory committee note may cast some doubt on their
pertinence in the context of discovery of experts. Close analysis, however,
dispels this doubt. The case cited in support of the advisory committee
note's statement rejected a work product argument for protection against
discovery of an expert's reports because they were not prepared by the
lawyer.5 Rather, they were "solely the work product of an expert witness
whom he employed to prepare it."5 Although the advisory committee note
thus appears to reject the notion that expert trial preparation constitutes
attorney work product, it does not necessarily follow that policies underlying the work product doctrine are inapplicable. Rather, the rule simply
replaces the work product categorization with provisions reflecting similar
policies. 7
11Cf Hick=man,329 U.S. at 510 (privacy in trial preparation is essential to the orderly working of the judicial system).
I Communications of an expert on occasion might be protected by the attorney-client
privilege. For example, Professor Friedenthal noted that reports made solely or primarily
for transmission to an attorney might be privileged. Friedenthal, supra note 46, at 458. The
Supreme Court recently has held that communications of a party's employee to the attorney
may be privileged. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981). But see 4 J. MOORE.
supranote 3, 26.66[1], at 26-469 ("If memoranda prepared by counsel himself are not privileged,
afortiorireports prepared for him by experts are not."). The discussion in the text deals
with contexts where the privilege would be inapplicable, such as where the knowledge and
opinions of an expert are sought, not his actual communications to counsel. See C. WRIGHT
& A. MILLER, supra note 3, § 2029, at 243 (knowledge of an expert in and of itself is not privileged). If the privilege is applicable, discovery is precluded by FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
0 FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note.
" See cases cited supra notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
United States v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174, 177 (5th Cir. 1967).

SId
The case cited by the advisory committee note is reflective of the debate that existed
prior to the promulgation of rule 26(b)(3), which was adopted at the same time as rule 26(b)(4),
on whether the work product doctrine was limited to materials prepared by attorneys. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee note. A conclusion that non-attorney trial preparation material is not "work product" does not necessarily mean it is not protected by reason
of policies similar to those supporting the work product doctrine. Although it does not contain the word "work product," rule 26(b)(3) does not restrict its protection of trial preparation materials to that prepared by attorneys, but extends its protection to materials prepared
in anticipation of litigation by parties. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Indeed, the debate on whether
expert knowledge gained in anticipation of litigation is work product continues, but there

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:597

Indeed, the free ride policy clearly is reflected by another portion of the
advisory committee note which states:
Past judicial restrictions on discovery of an adversary's expert, particularily as to his opinions, reflect the fear that one side will benefit
unduly from the other's better preparation. The procedure established
in subsection (b)(4)(A) holds the risk to a minimum. Discovery is limited
to trial witnesses, and may be obtained only at a time when the parties
know who their experts will be. A party must as a practical matter
prepare his own case in advance of that time, for he can hardly hope
to build his case out of his opponent's experts.5
In addition, although two articles cited favorably by the advisory committee note criticized the application of the work product doctrine to experts,
they did so on the ground that the experts would be witnesses, and their
opinions would constitute evidence at trial, arguably leaving intact the doctrine's possible application to non-witness experts.59 Indeed, one of the articles characterized the discouraging laziness policy and protecting confidentiality policy as aspects of the unfairness doctrine as applied by the courts,'
a doctrine the advisory committee note explicitly espouses."' Thus, notwithstanding its disclaimer of the work product rationale, the advisory committee note itself suggests the pertinence of the free ride policy.
Other authorities suggest the pertinence of the free ride policy as well.
One court has stated that the purpose behind the requirement of a court
order for non-interrogatory discovery of trial expert witnesses under rule
26(b)(4)(A)(ii) "is to insure that the movant's only interest is in obtaining
information for cross-examination."62 This statement implies that although
discovery of testifying experts is permitted to assure adequate opportunity for cross-examination at trial, the rule is intended to limit the risk that
information will be elicited for other uses, such as finding support for the
is no question that it is protected. Compare 8 C. WRIGHT & A.MILLER,supranote 3, S2029,
at 243, (arguing that knowledge of an expert is not part of work product) with 4 J. MOORE,
supranote 3, 26.66[2], at 26-480 (arguing that the "facts known and opinions held" language
of.the introductory clause means "of course, that the expert cannot be deposed and questioned regarding the trial preparation work.").
5 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(bX4) advisory committee note.
5g Friedenthal, supranote 46, at 479; Long, supra note 45, at 141-42. Current rule 26(b)(4)
accepts this criticism by permitting discovery of anticipated testimony, but retains more extensive protection against discovery of non-witness experts.
' Friedenthal, supra note 46, at 479 (laziness); id. at 482 (confidentiality). Professor Friedenthal criticizes the confidentiality basis for protection because it is inconsistent with the requirement that one disclose facts. Id. See also Comment, A Proposed Amendment to Rule
26(b)(4)(B): The Expert Twice Retained, 12 U. MICH. J.L. Ref. 533,536-42 (1979), which discerned
three aspects of the "unfairness" doctrine: (1) appropriation of the opponent's "property"
in the form of the expert's services; (2) discouragement of laziness; and (3) encouragement
of the seeking out of expert advice, and states that the third aspect has not received judicial
articulation.
81 See supra text accompanying note 43.
82 In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 77 F.R.D. 39, 41 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
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discovering party's case out of the efforts of the other party.3 Similarly,
prohibiting discovery of retained or specially employed experts in the ordinary case and totally prohibiting discovery of informally-consulted experts have been viewed as having the purposes of encouraging thorough
trial preparation" and discouraging laziness. 5 Case law interpreting the
rule indicates that parties may not be able even to obtain the names of retained, specially employed, or informally consulted experts, largely on the
same rationale.68 More generally, cases suggest that the rule essentially
requires the party seeking discovery to "find and use your own experts"
to suggest avenues for development of its case, not to rely on the trial
preparation of its opponent.6 7 Thus, the "free ride" policy is clearly pertinent in resolving issues of expert discovery.
Another limiting policy reflected by rule 26(b)(4) is deference to an expert's feelings of loyalty. This policy recognizes and defers to the expert's
potential emotional aversion to giving the benefit of his general expertise
to his employer's opponents.68 It is reflected by the provision that limits

13 Professor Friedenthal notes the risk that discovery of trial experts could elicit information to support one's own case, but takes the position that the goal of having decisions
based on the true facts overcomes this objection to discovery of trial experts. See FriedenthaI, supra note 46, at 487. By limiting discovery of trial experts, the rule only partially adopts
his position.
See Tahoe Ins. Co. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., 84 F.R.D. 362, 363 (D. Idaho 1979);
8 C. WRIGHT &A. MILLER, supranote 3, § 2032, at 255-56.
See Tahoe Ins. Co., 84 F.R.D. at 363; Graham, PartOne, supra note 3, at 903.
See, e.g., Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hosp. & Training School for Nurses, 622 F.2d 496
(10th Cir. 1980); Perry v. W.S. Darley & Co., 54 F.R.D. 278 (E.D. Wis. 1971). The issue is discussed in Note, Discovery ofNon stifying Experts' Identities Under the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 80 MICH. L. Rzv. 513 (1982).
11See, e.g., Marine Petroleum Co. v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 641 F.2d 984, 992-93 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) ("Rule 26(bX(4}B) implicitly recognizes that a party might well be deterred from
thorough preparation of his case were it possible for his opponent to freely discover information from a hired expert whose assistance is important but yet not so vital as to require
testimony at trial."); Inspiration Consol. Copper Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 60 F.R.D.
205, 210 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (the court, denying discovery of an expert on matters to which he
would not testify, stated, "It is easy enough for the moving party to obtain his own expert
opinion based on the facts and figures discovered from the plaintiff's books and records:');
Seiffer v. Topsy's Int'l, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 69, 72 (D. Kan. 1975) (design of the discovery rules
prohibits a party from "delv[ing] at will into an expert mind solely to sustain its own burden
of preparing for litigation."); In re Brown Co. Sec. Litig., 54 F.R.D. 384, 385 (E.D. La. 1972)
("The purpose of Rule 26(b)(4) is to prevent a party from building his case with opinions of
experts that his opponent engages for assistance and guidance in the preparation of the merits
of litigation."). But cf Graham, PartOne, supra note 3, at 927 nn.122-23 (work product doctrine rejected under rule 26(b)(4)).
A pre-rule 26(b)(4) opinion reflecting the "loyalty" policy is Boynton v. R. J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 36 F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1941), quoted supra note 45. Recognition of an expert's emotional loyalty to the position of the party who obtains his opinions was made in
Ager v. Jane C. Stormont Hosp. & Training School for Nurses, 622 F.2d 496, 503 (10th Cir.
1980) (aversion of health care providers to assisting plaintiffs' counsel requires denial of
discovery of identities of evaluative consultants which will result in a greater willingness
of experts to render opinions).
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the information that must be disclosed as a matter of course by experts
who will testify to information directly related to their anticipated
testimony,69 and more generally by the rule's overall protection of hired
experts. They normally will not be required to speculate on theories that
might be helpful to their employer's opponent or to educate the opponent
generally in their areas of expertise. This is so notwithstanding the degree
to which the experts are involved in their employer's trial preparation (so
long as their opinions can be deemed to have been formulated in anticipation of litigation), and notwithstanding the availability of compensation
under rule 26(b)(4)(C). Thus, they are protected even though the pertinence
of the free ride and financial unfairness policies may be minimal.
In summary, four primary policies are pertinent in resolving the proper
scope of discovery of in-house experts." These are the policy of liberal
discovery, the policy of avoiding financial unfairness, the free ride policy,
and the policy of deference to an expert's feelings of loyalty. The propriety of applying these policies to discovery of experts might be questioned
if courts were writing on a blank slate. 1 However, the validity of these
policies and their appropriate balance have been presumptively established
through the promulgation of rule 26(b)(4), which reflects and endorses them.
Thus, absent an amendment to the rule, the task of courts should be not
to question these policies, but to apply them to the in-house expert dilemma in a manner consistent with the balance struck under the rule. In doing
so, it is important to be cognizant of the reasoning underlying these policies,
and to take into account pertinent distinctions between in-house experts
and the categories of experts clearly addressed by the rule.
IV.

THE POLICIES APPLIED TO THE IN-HOUSE EXPERT
A.

The Utility of Liberal Discovery

No pretense should be made that wide-open discovery of in-house experts
will not serve the purpose of discovery to assure broad knowledge by all
parties of facts and information relating to issues in a case. If the in-house
expert has any knowledge, first-hand or otherwise, of facts or information
pertinent to the case, discovery of the expert may ferret out matters

' See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A).
v It also has been suggested that the rule's protective provisions are designed to encourage
access to experts and encourage full disclosure by the expert to the client. See Graham, Part
One, supranote 3, at 902 n.34. These policies are encompassed within those discussed in the
text. For example, the confidentiality aspect of the free ride policy will encourage reticent
experts to make themselves available and make full disclosure to the client.
"' See, e.g., Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of The FederalRules of Civil
Procedure:PartTwo, An EmpiricalStudy and a Proposal,U. ILL. L.F. 169,191 (1977) (questioning the fear that discovery of experts may permit one party to build his own case through
the other party's experts) [hereinafter cited as Graham, Part Two].
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previously unknown to the discovering party. An engineer who has examined the wreckage of an airplane may have noticed aspects of the wreckage
missed by an examination performed by the discovering party. A chemist
may know of scientific principles relating to the composition of a substance
that is the subject of the litigation, and these principles might be unknown
and of assistance to his employer's opponent. An expert's opinion may
generate new ideas or theories that can be put to use by the adversary,
or lead the adversary to examine facts that otherwise would not have been
explored. Such theories and facts may be those most appropriate to consider in resolving the issues in the case. Permitting only limited discovery
of trial experts hinders the adversary's ability to learn of these facts and
theories and therefore may prevent resolution of a dispute based on the
truth. Limitations on in-house expert discovery can be seen as implicit permission to "hold back" relevant data if other discovery requests do not call
72
for its disclosure.
However, these same arguments are equally applicable to other experts
who are clearly covered by the rule. In the usual case, they will know of
facts and may have formed opinions that may be of use to the adversary.
Yet discovery of such information is clearly limited by the rule." Thus, the
ambiguities of rule 26(b)(4) should not be resolved with a mere flick of the
hand and the incantation of "liberal discovery," with a resultant brew of
discovery with no special limitations. Rather, inquiry must be made into
whether discovery of in-house experts may be more useful than that of other
experts in effectuating the goals of discovery. If so, such a distinction may
justify broader discovery than is permitted of other experts.
One possible basis upon which to distinguish the value of information
obtained from a regular employee from that obtained from other experts
is that as a practical matter, it is potentially more useful to the discovering party at trial. If discovery elicits opinions from the regularly employed
expert that are adverse to his employer, the adversary may attempt to
call the employee as a witness at trial.74 If the testimony at trial is consistent with that obtained through discovery, it may be seen as courtroom
"dynamite" by the jury. The fact that the witness is or was an employee
71Professor Graham has noted that non-testifying experts also may have made inquiries
that form the basis of opinions of testifying experts. Deeming such non-testifying experts
as "second-tier" experts, he notes that while testifying experts would be required to disclose
information received from them that form the bases for their opinions, under the current
rule the validity of that data cannot be questioned through discovery of the non-testifying
expert. Graham, Part Two, supra note 71, at 196-99.
7 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4).
71Professor Graham notes that while "the law is unclear as to whether a party may compel testimony at trial from his adversary's expert or from any other expert whom the calling
party has not retained," most states permit such a practice, and the general federal approach
permits it. Graham, Part One, supra note 3, at 934-36. See also 4 J. MOORE, supra note 3,
26.66[1], at 26-469 (general American rule is that an expert stands on the same footing as
any other witness and may be compelled to testify).
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of a party indicates that that party has some confidence in his abilities,
perhaps more so than an expert hired on a short-term basis. The fact-finder
may assume (legitimately or not) that the employee has access to a broader
range of factual data on which to base his opinion than does the expert who
was hired independently and was shown only what the employer chose to
reveal. In addition, testimony adverse to his employer may appear to be
contrary to an employee's interest. There is a distinct likelihood that the
testimony of such a witness would, for these reasons, be given more weight
by the fact-finder than that of other expert witnesses."
However, the fact that discovery of in-house experts may lead to more
"useful" evidence to the adversary than discovery of other experts does
not necessarily lead to the conclusion that there is a weightier justification for discovery. It may actually be a reason to deny discovery. In many,
if not most, cases, the extra weight given to this testimony as a practical
matter would be inappropriate. If any issue that turns on expert testimony
merits a trial, the issue is by definition subject to legitimately differing
opinions. The fact that one expert is regularly employed by a party does
not in and of itself make his opinion more legitimate than others. Only his
relative qualifications and experience should make a legitimate difference
in this regard. Because the jury may give extra weight to the employee's
testimony because of the employment relationship, however, the party calling him is interjecting testimony that can be seen as prejudicial. Whether
this prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence so as to warrant its exclusion at trial may be subject to question, but its mere existence
destroys the "utility" argument for more expansive discovery than that
permitted of other experts. The increased practical utility of the evidence
to the discovering party does not make it more relevant than evidence that
could be obtained through discovery of other experts.
Another basis for distinguishing discovery of in-house experts from that
of others stems from the possibility that in fact, because of their employment and familiarity with their employer, in-house experts may be aware
of more facts than independent experts. There is more potential relevant
information in the mind of the regularly employed expert than in the minds
of others. The more potential relevant information there is to be obtained,
the argument would run, the more there is to be learned through discovery,
and thus the more its goals will be effectuated.
" Professor Graham notes that disclosure at trial that an expert was previously retained
by the examining party's opponent "is an obvious attestment of the expert's qualifications,
and disclosure of the expert's unfavorable opinion being presented by the opponent may be
highly influential with the jury. The jury will probably give undue weight to the expert's

testimony solely because they know the opponent consulted the same expert." Graham, Part
Two, supranote 71, at 195. He suggests prohibitions on such disclosure. Id. at 196. The same,
if not more, weight would likely be given to the unfavorable testimony of a regular employee.
Yet, it would seem much more difficult to avoid disclosure of the employment relationship.
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This argument also has its flaws. First, the only reason an employee,
because of his employment, would have knowledge of more facts about his
employer than would an expert contracted for the purpose of litigation is
that the employee had access to these facts prior to his work in anticipation of litigation. Rule 26(b)(4) does not preclude discovery of these facts,
even from experts."' It only limits discovery of facts known and acquired
or developed by experts in anticipation of litigation or for trial, not those
obtained earlier. It does not limit discovery of the knowledge gained by
persons who were actors or witnesses to the occurrence underlying the
suit." Although an employee may be a quicker study as an expert because
of his familiarity with his employer's operations, the additional knowledge
the employee may possess because of his regular employment is not shielded
from the adversary's view. Thus, the possibility that the employee may
have more potential relevant information than other experts that may be
obtained if discovery is freely permitted does not justify distinguishing him
from other experts in discovery. The additional information is discoverable
even if the rule is applied to the in-house expert, and avoiding its limitations will not make additional information available.
Second, the rule itself makes no distinction among retained experts
dependent upon how extensively they have reviewed the party's operations and practices. In many cases the retained experts may well eventually
acquire more "background" information upon which to form their conclusions than the employee who is asked to look into the matter. The fact that
one is a regular employee does nothing to distinguish him from a retained
expert who has been immersed in the party's practices. His status merely
gives him a distinction without a difference.
Thus, no valid justifications based on effectuating the general purposes
of discovery are apparent to distinguish in-house experts from others. This
implies that they should receive at least as much protection as other experts if the other policies underlying the rule are applicable. However,
before making a final conclusion to this effect and determining the proper
degree of protection, if any, those other policies should be explored.
B.

Financial Unfairness

The existence of financial unfairness resulting from discovery of in-house
experts and the capacity of rule 26(b)(4) to rectify it has a bearing on the
extent to which discovery should be permitted. If no financial unfairness
exists, at least one policy underlying the rule's limitations is not present,
arguably justifying more liberal discovery than is permitted of experts

"
T

See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
FED. R. CIr. P. 26(b4) advisory committee note.
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clearly covered by the rule.78 On the other hand, if the rule cannot rectify
any financial unfairness to the extent it does in the context of discovery
of other expetts, more extensive limitations on discovery might be justified.
Some have suggested that no financial unfairness concerns are presented
when discovery is sought of regularly-employed experts. One federal
magistrate, holding in-house experts to be unprotected by rule 26(b)(4)
stated, "Of course, this fact [that the expert was an employee of the defendant] would also not warrant the defendant seeking expenses or compensation for the time of the expert."79 Professors Wright and Miller also take
this position without explanation. 0
Notwithstanding these unexplained suggestions, however, financial unfairness clearly exists if no compensation is provided on discovery. The
employer presumably will pay the in-house expert wages for time spent
working on the litigation and responding to discovery. Although a discovering party might argue that these expenditures reflect an overhead expense
that would have been incurred without litigation, this argument ignores
the fact that the expenditures would not have been made for the work upon
which discovery is sought. If the employee is diverted from other tasks,
the employer loses the benefits of the employee's productivity resulting
from those tasks, or incurs expenses in hiring a substitute employee to pursue them. If the employee's regular position entails work solely related to
litigation, the employer will have incurred expenses in creating the position and the workplace, and the existence of the position without the litigation cannot be assumed. In either event, an employer usually will have incurred expenses in developing a regular employee's expertise. A party obtaining discovery of in-house experts is reaping the benefits of these costs
incurred by the employer in the same manner that occurs with respect to
"retained or specially employed" experts. Absent compensation by the
discovering party, comparable "financial unfairness" would flow from free
discovery.
Thus the pertinent question becomes whether this financial unfairness
can be rectified by the provisions of the current rule. It attempts to remedy
the financial unfairness resulting from discovery of non-testifying "retained
or specially employed" experts by providing that the court (1)shall require
the party seeking discovery to pay the expert a reasonable fee for time
spent in responding to discovery and (2) shall require the party seeking
discovery to pay the other party a fair portion of the fees and expenses
"8It is not clear, however, that lack of financial unfairness would favor more liberal
discovery. The rule attempts to rectify financial unfairness when it exists. Assuming rectification is adequate, no financial unfairness does exist in fact when experts clearly covered
by the rule are subject to discovery. Yet, discovery of these experts is still limited.
" Clark v. General Motors Corp., 20 FED.R. SERV. 2d (Callaghan) 679,687 (D. Mass. 1975).
o C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, § 2034, at 259. See also Marine Petroleum Co. v.
Champlin Petroleum Co., 641 F.2d 984, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (dicta); Russo v. Merck & Co., 21
F.R.D. 237 (D.R.I. 1957) (pre-rule 26(b)(4) decision).
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reasonably incurred by the latter in obtaining facts from the expert." The
first requirement can be met by requiring payment to the employer of the
wages paid to the employee on account of the time spent by the latter
responding to discovery. While such a practice does not comport with a
literal reading of the rule, it can easily be viewed as a form of indemnity
consistent with the rule's overall scheme to prevent financial unfairness.'
The only difficulty with meeting the second requirement is determining
the appropriate amount. Allocation of expenses for in-house experts poses
problems not present with respect to experts in other categories. With
respect to the latter, it will normally be quite simple to ascertain the total
"fees and expenses incurred ... in obtaining facts and opinions from the
expert."' This will be the total amount paid to the retained expert, and
the only debatable question under the rule will be what constitutes a "fair
portion"' to compensate the party who hired the expert.
Where the expert is a regular employee of a party, however, the total
expense incurred in obtaining the benefits of his expertise is not so easily
ascertained. Professor Graham presumes that the salary of a regular
employee engaged in studying litigation would be accounted for in the
employer's records as litigation costs rather than, for example, research
and development.' If an employer did so account for the employee's wages,
it would seem at first glance appropriate to use the total wages so allocated
on the litigation as the "base" from which to determine the appropriate
expense allocation. However, use of this figure will fail to remedy the
discovering party's appropriation of other costs, such as productivity and
training costs, incurred by the employer. These types of costs are not incurred when a party uses an outside expert.
The unfairness of leaving these amounts uncompensated may be at least
partially alleviated by adding a premium to the wages paid to the employee
for his work on the litigation in determining the amount incurred by the
employer. A benchmark, although somewhat arbitrary, figure for the appropriate amount can be the "going rate" for independent experts with
similar qualifications in the employee's field. Because the employee is in

81

FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(O).

Logan argues that the provision requiring compensation of an expert for his time is
inconsistent with an intent to include in-house experts within the rule. Logan, supra note
3, at 11. This seems questionable. The rule simply attempts to rectify potential financial unfairness resulting from discovery of experts by requiring compensation to the appropriate
person. In the usual case, this will entail some compensation directly to the expert where
the time expended is clearly attributable to the discovering party. This is what the rule provides. It is difficult to perceive that the rule anticipates that no such compensation from the
discovering party would be appropriate if someone other than that party paid the expert
for his time, through an "advance," for example. This should be the reading of the rule
regardless of whether the expert is a regular employee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C).
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C).

Graham, PartOne, supra note 3, at 942 n.197.
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essence a substitute for an expert who would charge the "going rate," and
because an outside expert's education costs and market "production value"
are presumably reflected roughly in this rate, it is not unfair to use it as
the equivalent for the expenses incurred by the employer. This rate
multiplied by the hours expended by the employee on the litigation can
then be used as the base from which to allocate a "fair" portion to be paid
by the discovering party, in the same manner applied in determining appropriate compensation in the case of retained experts.
Thus, although financial unfairness may result from permitting uncompensated discovery of in-house experts, it can be remedied in a manner designed to approximate, albeit roughly, that provided for in the rule
for independent experts. Consequently, the financial unfairness policy does
not counsel greater or lesser limits on discovery of in-house experts than
exist with respect to "retained or specially employed experts."
C. The "FreeRide" Policy
Rule 26(b)(4)'s effectuation of the free ride policy through its protection
of expert trial preparation apparently envisions the following scenario. In
many instances a party will employ more than one expert to study the matters subject to litigation, but only some of them will testify. Those who
will testify often will not be identified until relatively late in the litigation
process.' Prior to the identification of trial witnesses, a "mulling over" process involving the experts, party, and attorney presumably will occurY They
will discuss and develop various theories on the issues requiring expert
testimony. Decisions will be made to press some theories in litigation and
to abandon others. Once these decisions are made, those experts who will
be used as witnesses will be identified and the theories embraced will be
disclosed. The theories to be used at trial may be disclosed through
discovery of the experts who will testify, and perhaps through interrogatories that request opinions or contentions that relate to fact or the

See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note. ("Discovery is limited to trial
witnesses, and may be obtained only at a time when the parties know who their expert
witnesses will be. A party must as a practical matter prepare his own case in advance of
that time....").

See, e.g., Inspiration Consol. Copper Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 60 F.R.D. 205
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), where discovery of an accountant was denied as to matters to which he would
not testify at trial. At a deposition, the accountant testified that "he checked, analyzed and
commented on various drafts of claims prepared by Inspiration employees, and that he had
since worked with them and Inspiration's counsel in preparing for trial." Id. at 208. The court
stated that to permit discovery "would tend . . . to expose the theories and opinions that
were sifted to arrive at the theory of the claim for relief with the aid of an expert." Id. at
210. See also Graham, PartOne, supra note 3, at 942 n.197 (suggesting a specially employed

expert "would assist the attorney in understanding various complex matters, in formulating
strategy for the presentation of expert information, and in preparing cross-examination of
the opponent's expert.").
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application of law to fact." However, to effectuate the free ride policy, the
actual mulling over process of developing and sifting through various potential theories on the pertinent issues is protected, absent "exceptional
circumstances."8 9
With the foregoing as the anticipated scenario, it is clear that the free
ride policy is applicable to in-house experts as well as independent ones.90
The protected process of sifting and developing expert theories is as likely,
if not more likely, to occur with regularly-employed experts as with contracted ones. Indeed, because regular employees may have more familiarity with the product or process at issue and because they are readily
available, they often will be the most logical candidates for the "mulling
over" task. In addition, because they may be involved in this process with
independent experts, unrestricted discovery poses an unnecessarily high
risk that they will disclose the facts and opinions acquired or developed
by independent experts that are explicitly protected by rule 26(b)(4), thus
thwarting its literal proscriptions.
A conclusion that discovery of in-house experts is limited by the free
ride policy also is consistent with discovery principles that do not pertain
directly to experts. Rule 26(b)(3), which was enacted at the same time as
rule 26(b)(4),11 extends work product protection not only to materials
prepared by an attorney, but also to those prepared by a party. 2 The rule
explicitly protects the work product of a party's "agent,' 93 a term that encompasses employees.9 Absolute immunity attaches to the opinions and
conclusions of these persons,95 an immunity that rule 26(b)(4) abrogates completely only with respect to experts who will testify, and then only regarding their proposed testimony.' Similarly, the attorney-client privilege applies to in-house as well as independent counsel.17 These principles reflect

'o

See FED. R. Civ. P. 33(b).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
Cf.Marine Petroleum Co. v.Champlin Petroleum Co., 641 F.2d 984 (D.C. Cir. 1980) where

the court denied discovery of information obtained by an expert who had previously been
an independent consultant on general energy policies when the information sought was obtained after he was asked to give assistance on potential litigation. In language that is equally
applicable to in-house experts, the court stated: "The rule's tacit acknowledgement of the
necessity of meticulous preparation has equal force whether the expert is one originally and
exclusively retained for anticipated litigation or one whose employment responsibilities are
expanded to encompass consultation and advice in expectation of litigation." Id. at 993.
"3 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee note.
9 See FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(3) advisory committee note.
91FED. R.
5

Civ. P. 26(b)(3).

See Almaguer v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 55 F.R.D. 147 (D. Neb. 1972).

" FED. R.

CIv. P. 26(b)(3).

Rule 26(b)(3) is explicitly subject to the provisions of rule 26(b)(4). At least one court
has held, as an alternative to a conclusion that an in-house expert's reports were protected
by rule 26(b)(4), that they were protected by rule 26(b)(3). See Breedlove v. Beech Aircraft
Corp., 57 F.R.D. 202 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
" See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
"
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a view that the policies underlying protection of the trial preparation process extend to all persons legitimately engaged in it, including employees,
not simply to independent attorneys. In light of this view, it appears that
that discovery of all aspects of the "mulling over" process, regardless of
whether or not the experts involved are in-house experts, is limited. Indeed, requests for free discovery into this process is analogous to asking
for all the sources used by an attorney in devising his ultimate legal
theories,98 a request clearly not within the scope of the discovery rules.
The only difference between regularly employed experts and independent experts that arguably relates to the sub-policies of the free ride policy
is that of the employer's relatively easy access to its employees. A discovering party can argue that because of the ease of access, an employer will
not "work very hard" to acquire the information sought and therefore the
policy of encouraging diligence will not be significantly frustrated by permitting discovery. One flaw in this argument is that the rule makes no
distinctions premised on the amount of diligence that the party subject to
discovery has exhibited.9 It limits discovery of a retained expert even if
he is the only expert who has been consulted and his compensation is
minimal. Second, even if the degree of diligence were a relevant factor,
the easy task of asking the employee to study the issues is not the only
diligence being appropriated. The work of the employee is the substance
of what is being taken and therefore should be imputed to the employer
in ascertaining the extent of the appropriation. Finally, the practical implication of this argument for discovery is that the employer should search
out and hire independent experts if it desires limitations on discovbry. To
encourage such a practice would encourage economic waste, 0 contrary to
rule l's admonition that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be construed
to secure inexpensive determinations of actions."'
" However, Professor Friedenthal states that opinions and conclusions of experts are not
like the impressions of an attorney or his client, but constitute evidence in themselves. See
Friedenthal, supra note 41, at 472-73. He criticizes cases differentiating facts and opinions,
permitting discovery of the former: "It is impossible to justify such a distinction within the
framework of the Hickman doctrine. Either expert information ought to be protected because

it forms a part of the strategy of the party's case, or it ought to be revealed in its entirety."
Friedenthal, supra note 41, at 473. By protecting both facts and opinions, the rule appears
to incorporate Professor Friedenthal's first option. This is so notwithstanding the advisory
committee note's protest that the rule rejects the work product rationale. See supra notes
48-61 and accompanying text.
" In fact, the rule's total proscription of discovery of informally consulted experts results
in greater protection against discovery of experts with respect to whom the employer nor-

mally would exercise a lesser degree of diligence than it would with retained or specially
employed experts. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
1 Professor Graham has raised a similar criticism. See Graham, Part One, supra note 3,
at 943 n.199.
101FED. R. Civ. P. 1. A discovering party may argue that this policy would be better effectuated by permitting free discovery, as that may reduce the expense of litigation by possibly
negating the need to hire its own expert. However, this argument fails because even if the
discovering party was permitted to discover the opposing party's expert, he would have to
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Where the discovering party seeks the fruits of tasks that are similar
to, if not part of, an in-house expert's regular duties, the discovering party
might make another argument for discovery related to the free ride policy.
This argument is that the information sought was prepared in the ordinary
course of business.
For example, an in-house expert, as part of his regular employment
duties, may analyze products that are defective with a view towards product improvement. On occasion, the employer may request the employee
to analyze a product that is the subject of litigation. In this context, the
discovering party might argue that discovery is permissible because it is
seeking materials that are regularly prepared by the employee. Analogizing cases interpreting rule 26(b)(3) as not protecting materials prepared
in the regular course of business," 2 the discovering party may argue that
such materials would have been prepared even without the potential of
litigation. The fact that the materials sought would have existed without
litigation leads to the conclusion that the policy of encouraging diligence
in trial preparation will not be undercut by permitting discovery.
This argument ignores the other sub-policies of the free ride policy,
discouragement of laziness and protection of confidentiality in the "mulling over" process. In addition, the employer may have created the
employee's position in part because of its desire to have qualified persons
work on litigation. If free discovery is permitted, it will be a disincentive
to the creation of such positions, or to asking employees to pursue such
work. Thus, the policy of encouraging diligence in trial preparation may
in fact be adversely affected by permitting free discovery. Other social
benefits stemming from the existence of these types of employment positions, such as the improvement of product safety, may also be adversely
10 3
affected.
compensate the expert for that discovery under rule 26(b)(4)(C). Thus, discovery will not

significantly reduce the discovering party's expenses. In addition, in most cases the discovering
party is likely to hire its own experts regardless of its ability to obtain discovery of its opponent's experts. Finally, even if the argument has some validity, the other policies discussed
in this article appear to have been deemed, through the promulgation of the rule, to override it, as a similar argument could be made with respect to experts clearly covered by the rule.
'o See cases cited in C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, S 2024, at 199.
' Several cases have suggested that a policy of improving public safety is a pertinent
factor in resolving discovery disputes. In Hermsdorfer v. American Motors Corp., 96 F.R.D.
13, 15 (W.D.N.Y. 1982), the court stated that to subject an expert employed for litigation to

full discovery because he was also retained to assist in product improvement "would undermine the important public policy of encouraging defendants to repair or improve their products without fear that such actions will later be used against them in a lawsuit... :'In United

Air Lines v. United States, 26 F.R.D. 213 (D. Del. 1960) discovery was sought of opinions and
conclusions not made in anticipation of litigation by experts who had investigated an air crash.
Denial of discovery was premised in part on the government's contention that disclosure would
discourage investigators from testifying fully before investigatory boards and from assess-

ing blame freely, resulting in a detrimental effect on flight safety programs. Id. at 219. Similarly, in Gilman v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 316, 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), reports of director and
board of inquiry of mental hospital were held not subject to discovery because of the need
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The true issue underlying this argument is whether the material sought
was in fact prepared in anticipation of litigation. If it was not, the expert's
product simply will not fall within the rule, but this fact gives no warrant
for distinguishing in-house experts from others when their work was in
anticipation of litigation. At least one recent work product case has recognized that even though an employee's "product" may be part of his regular
duties, at some point the focus of the employee's activities will become in
anticipation of litigation, and once this shift in focus has occurred, it should
be protected by the work product policies. 14 A similar focus is appropriate
in the in-house expert context. If, in fact, the employee's work was in anticipation of litigation and therefore fits within the scope of rule 26(b)(4),
the free ride policy should apply fully.
The foregoing shows that the policies of liberal discovery do not counsel
more liberal discovery of in-house experts than that provided other experts
under rule 26(b)(4). It shows that financial "unfairness" concerns exist with
respect to discovery of in-house experts but can be accommodated by means
similar to those provided by the existing rule. It also illustrates that the
free ride policy applies to in-house experts and mandates some limitations
upon their amenability to discovery. Thus, resolving the in-house expert
dilemma by permitting unrestricted discovery"' is inappropriate. However,
the appropriate degree of limitation on.in-house expert discovery is not
apparent from the application of these policies. One of them, the free ride
policy, justifies both the total prohibition against discovery of informally
consulted experts. 6 and the qualified protection of retained or specially
employed experts.' On the surface, analogizing in-house experts to either
category does not seem unreasonable if focus is solely on this policy.
However, analysis of the other policy underlying rule 26(b)(4), deference
to an expert's feelings of loyalty, shows that the most appropriate analogy
is to retained or specially employed experts.
D.

Loyalty

The manner in which the loyalty policy bears on rule 26(b)(4)'s contrast
between total prohibition against discovery of informally consulted experts
and limited discovery of retained or specially employed experts suggests
the appropriate standard for discovery of in-house experts. The impact of
to protect confidentiality and free discourse in investigations made to determine whether
steps were necessary to prevent recurrence of suicide attempts. A privilege not to disclose
the fruits of a process of critical self-analysis appears to have developed in recent years. See
Note, The Privilege of CriticalSelf-Analysis, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1983).
10 Carver v. Allstate Ins. Co., 94 F.R.D. 131, 134 (S.D. Ga. 1982).
"' See supra notes 25-32 and accompanying text.
106See cases and sources cited supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
107See supra notes 53-67 and accompanying text.
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this policy under the rule is reflected by what might be called the "anomaly" of the rule's total prohibition of discovery of informally-consulted
experts.
This anomaly is that although the rule gives greater protection to informally consulted experts than it does to retained or specially employed experts, fewer limiting policies apply to the former. The only limiting policies
that clearly apply to discovery of informally consulted experts are two of
the three aspects of the free ride policy, discouraging laziness (i.e.,
discouraging reliance on the other party's efforts to find experts for use
in the litigation), and encouraging diligence (i.e., encouraging parties to seek
out available expertise in their trial preparation). Financial unfairness is
not a major concern because the fact that the expert was "informally consulted" implies that minimal, if any, compensation has been paid him." 8 The
confidentiality aspect of the free ride policy is of minimal relevance because
informal consultation implies that the expert was not deeply involved in
the protected "mulling over" process, learning about the case and developing strategy. Respect for an expert's feelings of loyalty, in the sense that
this policy protects against discovery of experts, has little applicability
because an expert who has not been hired generally will have minimal feelings of loyalty towards the party who consulted him.
This anomaly is explained by the fact that informally consulted experts
are freely available for hire by the party seeking discovery. Because their
consultation was only informal, no emotional or legal inhibitions will normally prevent them from working for the other side."0 9 Thus, the rule prohibits discovery and instead requires the party seeking their expertise to
approach them personally, effectuating the policies of discouraging laziness
and encouraging diligence. In short, the non-existence of significant feel108 See USM Corp. v. American Aerosols, Inc., 631 F.2d 420, 425 (6th Cir. 1980) (lack of compensation is an important factor in concluding that an expert has been "informally consulted").
But see Note, Discovery of the Nonwvitness Expert UnderFederalRule of Civil Procedure26(b)(4),
67 IowA L. REv. 349,357 (1982)(suggesting that if payment were dispositive, parties could totally
hide experts from discovery by nonpayment).
109 Professor Graham speculates that informally consulted experts are likely to
cooperate
and be helpful if consulted by the adversary. See Graham,PartOne, supranote 3, at 938 n.172.
He would define an informally consulted expert as one the consulting party did not consider
to be of any assistance. Id. at 939 n.182. He suggests that free discovery of such experts would
discourage a search for experts. Id. at 940. He would not make compensation a determinative
factor in classifying informally consulted experts.
In Ager v. Jane C.Stormont Hosp. & Training School for Nurses, 622 F.2d 496 (10th Cir.
1980), the court declined to adopt Professor Graham's approach. It stated that the status
of an expert must be determined on an ad hoc basis, considering
(1)the manner in which the consultation was initiated; (2) the nature, type, and
extent of information or material provided to, or determined by, the expert in
connection with his review; (3) the duration and intensity of the consultative
relationship; and (4) the terms of the consultation, if any (e.g. payment, confidentiality of test data or opinions, etc.).

Id. at 501.
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ings of loyalty on the part of informally-consulted experts makes their expertise freely available if diligence is exercised by the party seeking
discovery, and thus justifies the total proscription of discovery.
As a practical matter, however, loyalty of a retained expert to his
employer will preclude his consulting for the other side. 110 Because of this
fact, the opposing party will be unable to obtain informal assistance through
a retained expert or to hire him for its own use, and the rule limits formal
assistance through discovery. The resulting overall scheme reflects a
preference that parties seek out and utilize experts who have no strong
loyalties to the opposition, thereby respecting such loyalties."'
The rule, however, recognizes that as a practical matter the only way
information can be obtained from a retained expert is through discovery.
Therefore it abrogates loyalty considerations and permits discovery if "exceptional circumstances" exist whereby a party cannot through due
diligence find qualified experts who can assist it on the subject matter of
a case."' Presumably under these circumstances, discussions of trial
strategy will remain protected, but the general expertise of the expert may
be explored. The rule thereby also reflects a preference that, notwithstanding loyalty considerations, some qualified expertise should be available to
all parties to a dispute. This preference justifies the limited discovery permitted of retained experts.
The fact that such "exceptional circumstances" justifying discovery of
an expert retained by an opponent may exist furnishes the key to ascertaining the appropriate limitations of discovery of in-house experts. There
may be occasions where the only qualified experts on an issue subject to
litigation are the regular employees of a party."' Their loyalty to their

"I Cf. Campbell Industries v. M/V Gemini, 619 F.2d 24, 26 (9th Cir. 1980) (affirming trial
court order that characterized ex parte communications with an expert retained by an opposing party as a "flagrant violation" of the rules governing discovery of experts).
" The preference has been reflected in at least one case dealing with discovery of in-house
experts. See Breedlove v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 57 F.R.D. 202, 205 (N.D. Miss. 1972) where
the court, denying discovery of reports made by in-house experts, specifically noted that "plaintiffs either have, or had the opportunity to have, experts of their own selection make critical
analysis and findings."
" See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B); In re Sinking of Barge "Ranger I", 32 FED. R. SERV. 2d
(Callaghan) 1708, 1711 n.4 (S.D. Tex. 1981) ("Rule 26(b)(4) is intended to allow a party who
cannot practicably obtain consultative expert advice or opinion on a given subject to discover
the facts known or opinions held by an expert retained by another party in connection with
that subject."). Professor Graham gives as an example of "extraordinary circumstances" a
situation where "an object is no longer available, either having been destroyed or changed
in form, therefore making the adversary's expert the only source of information concerning
the object." Graham, Part One, supra note 3, at 932 n.139. See also Friedenthal, supra note
46, at 484 (discovery of expert most necessary when a hired expert is the only one practically available, or he formed his opinion before items were changed or altered).
" For example, where the only facts a party alleging patent infringement has to support
its charges are tests made by its expert employees with a view towards litigation, discovery
of those tests to enable the defendant to meet those charges, and a finding of "exceptional
circumstances" triggering its permissibility clearly seem appropriate. See Loctite Corp. v.
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employer typically will be similar to, if not greater than, the loyalties of
retained experts. Few will be willing to sacrifice potentially long-term
employment for short-term assistance to their employer's opponent. Hence,
they will be practically unavailable for use by their employer's opponent,
as are experts under retainer in the ordinary case. Under these circumstances the rule's preference that some qualified expertise be available
to all parties to a dispute mandates the availability of some discovery. Absolute preclusion of discovery would be inconsistent with the rule's overall
scheme.
Because some limited availability of discovery of in-house experts is appropriate under the rule, in-house experts should be treated analogously
to retained or specially employed experts. The standard applicable for
discovery of these experts is readily available and, through experience, easy
to apply. It also reflects the circumstances under which the rule contemplates the abrogation of loyalty considerations, which are at least as
applicable to in-house experts as they are to retained experts.
CONCLUSION
If the drafters of rule 26(b)(4) had anticipated the problems its application to in-house experts would engender, they surely would have been more
careful in their choice of words. Ambiguities and redundancy within the
rule and advisory committee note have led to at least three different interpretations of how the rule applies in this context. In dealing with experts
more clearly covered by the rule's language, clear policies were reflected.
These policies are as pertinent to discovery of in-house experts as they
are to others. Poor drafting is not a reason for ignoring those policies in
the in-house expert context. Yet, many decisions that have attempted to
untangle the linguistic mess of the rule and its advisory committee note,
relying solely on the language of both, appear to have disregarded those
policies.
The policies reflected by the rule support the conclusion that discovery
of in-house experts should be treated in the same manner as discovery of
"6retained or specially employed" experts. Amendment of the rule to delete
the adjective "specially" before "employed" would eliminate the confusion
and be totally consistent with the policies reflected by the rule. Absent
an amendment, courts should resolve the issue based on these policies,
Fel-Pro, Inc., 30 FED. R. SERV. 2d (Callaghan) 1587,1596-97 (N.D. Ill. 1980). Although the Loctite court in this context found "exceptional circumstances," discovery might have been permissible on the ground that the experts were "fact" witnesses because they allegedly
"discovered" the nature of the infringement and are analogous to fact witnesses who view
conduct that allegedly leads to liability. See E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 24 F.R.D. 416, 421 (D. Del. 1959) (discovery granted in chemical patent infringement case where procedures used to determine chemical product approached being
ultimate fact and major issue).
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which were not intended to be abrogated in the context of in-house experts.
Decisions that have failed to do so and have concluded that discovery is
freely available are clearly wrong, as is the conclusion that total preclusion of discovery is the appropriate solution. Lawyers and judges know
that all language is pliable and that meaning must be sought by looking
beyond it. Courts should start looking beyond the fog. There is some
daylight out there.

